The National Water Commission Report is reviewed here as a professional document. This perspective is important to scholars in the field of water resources, where the terms of debate and areas of research are likely to be shaped for years to come by the findings of the commission report. A professional frame of reference is also suggested by the task and makeup of the commission. The commission's initial purpose was an objective analysis of water resource problems by a panel of disinterested experts. A large proportion of staff positions were filled by academics, and academics conducted research under commission sponsorship and funding.
The criteria applied in this review are scientific and analytical values. A professional document is judged by the validity of its assumptions, and assumptions should be explicit. The mark of a professional document is an analytical framework that structures what is to be considered and how. The findings and recommendations are weighed for logical consistency and supporting evidence.
The questions addressed in this review evolve from a professional perspective. We are concerned primarily with the overall framework of analysis: whether and how the concept of water was employed to organize and unify the overall effort. How did the commission view its charge, and how did it set boundaries between water problems and other problems? Did the commission pose the major questions in such a way that knowledge and expertise of the various relevant disciplines could be brought to bear? Further, what were the implications of the way the commission approached its task for what it did and did not consider? How are the framework and approach taken by the commission likely to affect the implementation of the recommendations?
In all fairness the National Water Commission Report is also a political document, and without doubt its character as a professional piece of work is partly due to the constraints imposed by politics. The creation of the commission grew out of a compromise between the leadership of the House and Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committees affecting the Copyright ¸ 1975 by the American Geophysical Union.
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Colorado River Basin Bill of 1968. It can be argued that the commission was set up to postpone as much as to settle problems, and its aggressive attack upon fundamental issues such as cost sharing must be viewed as an assertion of leadership. The commissioners, presidential appointees from diverse backgrounds among whom turnover was high, had to negotiate an agreement upon the contents of the report. The difficulties of staffing included lack of incentives for professionals to join an organization on a short-term basis. There was little time, and compared with other more recent water commissions, very little money. The atmosphere in which the commission worked was laced with stress. Policy making in water un4erwent some dramatic changes during the 5 years of the commission's duration; thus it was forced to draw conclusions from a moving picture. The four field hearings on the draft report held in 1973 are witness to the lack of agreement among agencies and interest groups about the course national water policy should pursue. Judged from a political perspective, the recommendations of the National Water Commission are surprisingly innovative.
Since the perspective of this review is professional, little attention is paid to political constraints. However important to a comprehensive judgment about the commission, a political review and evaluation is another task. This review is of the final report made available June 1973 [Luce et al., 1973] . The central concern is with the document itself, not with the way the commission handled its research task or the quality of supporting studies. The professional interests pursued here do not involve taking positions on the advisability of specific recommendations.
COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION OF ITS CHARGE
Some information on the way the National Water Commission perceived its charge from Congress is available from the preface to the report, which consists primarily of a short history of the establishment of the commission and the conduct of its work. The preface, section 3(a), of the National Water Commission Act reads:
The Commission shall (1) review present and anticipated national water resource problems, making such projections of water requirements as may be necessary and identifying alternative ways of meeting these requirements--giving consideration, among other things, to conservation and more efficient use of existing supplies, increased usability by reduction of pollution, innovations to encourage the highest economic use of water, interbasin transfers, and technological advances including, but not limited to, desalting, weather modification, and waste water purification and reuse; (2) consider economic and social consequences of water resource development on regional growth, on institutional arrangements, and on esthetic values affecting the quality of life of the American people; and (3) advise on such specific water resource matters as may be referred to it by the President and the [Luce et al., 1973, p. 44] . This seems to imply that solid waste disposal is a water resources problem. At other points in the text, transportation planning is the subject under discussion. The commission appears to have fallen into a conceptual trap: that activities involving some use of water are water resources problems. If this is so, it has addressed certain portions of a very wide range of problems but ignored others with no explanation as to why this was done. The general assumption of the report seems to be that if a problem has been discussed as a water resources problem, it is within the commission's purview. In a sense this assumption lets the experience with past programs and agencies determine not only what future programs and agencies are likely to exist, but also the focus of those agencies in terms of purposes and means, as defined by G. F. White in 1960. In a related way the commission seems to have taken the view that its charge was to address a range of issues about which controversies had occurred and to be idealistic about how arrangements to resolve those controversies might be made.
ALTERNATE APPROACHES NOT TAKEN
With any interpretation of its charges the commission faced a formidable task. Its interdisciplinary staff was engaged on a short-term basis. This handicapped communication and commitment. Still, further effort on specific interpretation of its charge and identification of a framework might well have been valuable. It might have adopted (l) a goals framework, (2) a problems framework, (3) an actions framework, or (4) a system framework with actions as a base.
A goals framework would set forth the goals of human endeavor, attempt to define those goals so that they could be measured at some level of information resolution, and determine how well specific endeavors would meet those goals. Whereas this has been the subject of university research by a group headed by Dean F. Peterson, such a framework may not have served the commission very well [Peterson et al., 1971] . Work is really only beginning on definition and measurement goals and objectives.
The commission did seem to adopt a problems framework in part. However, its criteria for study of those problems are not clear. The problems studied seem to be limited to those that have received discussion in the past and that seem to be important to the commissioners or the staff according to some Rationality. The report has a strong commitment to rationality. The commission's ideal is a detached disinterested stakeless expert who decides on the basis of complete and unbiased information. Numerous suggestions are made to improve the data base for decision making. In order to evaluate the multitudinous possibilities for combinations of water uses within a river basin the commission sees a need for systems analysis. The report strongly disapproves of bias in federal agencies in favor of their own missions. The National Water Commission followed the path set by previous commissions in observing the practice of federal water agencies in underestimating the cost and overestimating the benefits of their project proposals [Luce et al., 1973, p. 407 ]. In the view of the commission the construction agencies basically are just that: construction oriented. The agencies are basically builders. Fundamentally, they are not managers of either people or resources. The information that agencies generate about projects cannot necessarily be trusted.
In order to provide for more rational decision makers and decision making the commission attempts to suggest various ways to resist unwarranted special pressures. The independent review board that is prescribed to check the bias of federal construction agencies is an example.
The review board should be structured as an independent agency; nominally within the executive branch but insulated from the presidential politics by appointments which extended beyond the term of the President. A provision which would prohibit more than, say, four out of seven members to be selected from one particular political party would be an additional device to secure the board's independence of action. The review board would function free of any entanglements with the special interest of operating departments. By standing apart from the President's Office as an independent organization, there would be less opportunity to question the objectivity of the review boards actions when it is dealing with those water development proposals which the President may have cause to favor for personal or party reasons. A number of quite possibly false assumptions underlie the commission's preference for economic efficiency and money measurements: (1) that economic analysis is more precise than it is; (2) that in order for information to be expressed in commensurate units those units must be economic ones; (3) that partial information aggregation, say, into six dimensions rather than a thousand, is not useful; and (4) Such literature as exists on social indicators or designs for the aggregation of social and environmental information is not recognized in the report [Bauer, 1966; Peterson et al., 1971 ]. It would be unreasonable to ask the commission to take into account reports that were not available when they were completing their report. Still, it is reasonable to ask why they did not proceed in a direction that would lead to aggregation of information about, for instance, aesthetics. Others have done so [Brown, 1973] .
As this excerpt from
The idea that 'plain, textual terms,' which the commission favors for social, environmental, and interregional effects, do not impose a high cost on the decision maker is not entirely defensible [Luce et al., 1973, p. 381] . One of the reasons for the primacy of benefit-cost analysis is that it is represented by a single number readily available and understandable to decision makers. Social and environmental information can frequently be expressed in units not necessarily economic. Noneconomic measures, however, can be highly dimensional as to kind, location in space, and occurrence in time. Indices of social and environmental effects might be useful to the political process. The danger is that by allowing aggregation of other kinds of information the unaggregated information will be neglected because it is too unwieldy to be considered. It may not be necessary to point out that various kinds of aggregate indices that are in part misleading, e.g., the gross national product and the crime rate, nevertheless seem useful to at least some decision makers.
The commission report does attempt to look at indirect quantifications in the environmental area:
Values of water for fish, wildlife, and aesthetics cannot now be satisfactorily determined directly by economic evaluation. However, they can be indirectly valued by considering economic values of uses in the hydrologic system with and without these uses. These 'with and without' values would be determined so that informed judgments can be made on balancing of all uses within the hydrologic system. The limitations of a prescription that separates policy and administration have been amply discussed elsewhere. Such an argument was lucidly made long ago by Stein [1952] . Recently, Ostrom [1973] critically analyzed all the basic propositions of the classical Wilsonian school of public administration, including the separation of politics and administration. Indeed he covered many of these in a report to the commission [Ostrom, 1971] . Suffice it to note here that a more accurate description of policy making includes a whole process that encompasses all the choices and participants from the time when a problem is identified to the point where the impact of choices is actually felt. Realistic analysis of the policy-making process would focus upon relationships rather than distinctions and separations. For instance, the roport recognized that comprehensive basin-wide planning has not always had much effect upon the choice of which projects are actually authorized and funded [Luce et al., 1973, pp A realistic appraisal of interstate agencies also is missing. Among such interstate institutions the Delaware River Basin Commission and its copies are, for an unstated reason, the favorite, although river basin commissions are concluded to be unique and interesting; river basin commissions, the report recommends, should be allowed to go on doing whatever they do, which is nowhere discussed and criticized [Luce et al., 1973, p. 418] . The continuing problems of regional institutions, whatever their particular form, ought to have been specified. Simply stated, whatever their authority, regional institutions have lacked the continued support needed to act vigorously. Individual states lack the incentive to expend staff, funds, and energy on regional water planning and management. Where federal agencies are not able to dominate regional institutions, they, like the state, evidence no real commitment. The National Water Commission might have made a contribution by devising and recommending ways in which the pattern of incentives for the existing participants in regional institutions might have been altered or new supportive participants identified.
The underlying tenor of the report seems to be that their recommendations should be implemented on an 'all or none' basis. If this is so, it should be so stated. If this is not so, where a recommendation is independent of other recommendations, this should be stated, and it should be stated when a recommendation is dependent on others. Although it is true that policy changes in an incremental fashion, it is important that increments be defined so that no disasters result. In not carefully defining the decision space and in not considering sets of The best chance the National Water Commission Report might have had for impact was through the force of its quality as a professional document upon the students of water policy who are oriented toward innovation. It is very unlikely that the report itself will or could ever be used as a platform for reorganization of water policy. It is [oo discursive over too many separate unrelated topics. As we have already illustrated, the report essentially has no comprehensive framework to indicate what is important and what relates to what. The usefulness of the commission report as a blueprint for change is also severely limited by the lack of any theory that explains how we got where we are in water policy and how to go about changing. The commission needed to identify the incentives and disincentives that operate upon current participants in making water policy and the means by which and extent to which they might be changed.
The National Water Commission Report is a kaleidoscopic assembly of findings and recommendations. It is left to the policy makers to pick and choose recommendations while gambling on the practical consequences. Without question the National Water Commission Report's authors meant to change the costly fragmented distributive politics of water in which a variety of interests, even contradictory ones, are served. Instead, the report, itself fragmented and disjointed, is likely to become a part of and reinforce the existing decision-making process.
